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Should Cash Transfers Be Conditional? 















We study a Conditional Cash Transfer program in which the cash transfers to the mother only 
depends on the fulfilment of the national preventive visit schedule by her children born 
before she registered in the program. We estimate that preventive visits of children born after 
the mother registered in the program are 50% lower because they are excluded from the 
conditionality requirement. Using the same variation, we also show that attendance to 
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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs have become increasingly popular tools to foster 
human capital accumulation and reduce poverty in developing countries. According to 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009), CCT programs have been introduced in at least twenty-eight 
countries by 2009, covering between 20 and 40 percent of the population of these countries. 
While Latin American countries were the first ones in implementing these programs, they are 
being currently expanded in Africa and Asia. CCT programs have an education or health 
component, or both. The education component provides cash transfers to mothers if her 
school -age children are attending school. Typically, the health component implies that 
mothers receive cash transfers if their pre-school children are up to date with preventive 
health care visits.
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  In these preventive care visits, children‟s height and weight are measured, 
and the mother receives information on the nutritional status of her child, advice on nutrition 
and hygiene, and possibly nutritional supplements or medicines. 
 
CCT programs are complex interventions that jointly increase mother‟s income, the relative 
price of school attendance, health information, and the relative cost of access to health care 
services. Many evaluations exist of such CCT programs (among many others see Schultz 
2004, Gertler 2004, Behrman and Hoddinot 2005, Attanasio et al., 2005, Janvry, 2006; 
Barham and Maluccio 2009) but they typically do not provide estimates of the impact of 
individual components of the program, which is key to understand what elements are 
important for the overall impact observed and which might be less essential and, if costly, 
could be eliminated. In particular, in most available studies, the role of the conditionalities is 
not identified despite the fact that their role has received considerable attention in the recent 
policy debate.  
 
                                                          
2
 In a broader sense a CCT program is any program that provides cash if a condition is fulfilled. Under this 
broader definition, CCT programs also include interventions that provide cash transfers to individuals who 
remain HIV-negative (Kholer and Thornton, 2012) or programs that provide cash transfers to mother conditional 
on skilled birth attendance (Mazumdar et al., 2012 and Powell-Jackson and Hanson 2012). In this paper, we use 
the CCT term to refer to programs which were modelled after Bolsa Escola in Brazil and PROGRESA in 
México (Bourguignon et al. 2003; Skoufias and Parker, 2001).  
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From a theoretical point of view, conditionalities change the net cost of certain activities, 
typically related to investment in human capital. This change in relative prices will compound 
possible income effects that are triggered by the transfer itself. It is interesting to note that, as 
the program has different components, the same households might be receiving transfers for 
some activities that it would undertake regardless of its presence (such as enrolment in 
primary school of its youngest children) while considering whether to undertake a different 
activity (such as enrolment in secondary school of older children) that it might not undertake 
except for the conditionality that would trigger a payment. Therefore the same household will 
be affected by a change in income that is effectively unconditional and a change in the 
relative price of some specific investments activities that might be triggered through a 
substitution effect. 
 
CCT programs can also affect behaviour through channels different from income and 
substitution effects. CCT programs might help to overcome procrastination, especially in the 
case of preventive care as the program gives a schedule of preventive visits that children must 
fulfil by a given deadline. They can also raise the salience of the behaviour that they are 
incentivizing as well as endorse it (Benhassine et al, 2013). For instance, households might 
update their beliefs on the benefits of a given activity if the government is promoting it.  
Interestingly, comparing the effects of a pure unconditional cash transfer program with a 
CCT one would not allow one to tease out how important salience/endorsement effects would 
be vis a vis income and substitution effects: as we discuss below, our exercise can be 
informative about this distinction. 
 
In the policy debate, different opinions exist on the role of conditionalities. One possible 
argument is that conditionalities introduce un-necessary distortions. One view could be that if 
cash transfers are deemed desirable, either for redistributive purposes, or to alleviate liquidity 
constraints or similar imperfections, conditionalities would not be required as households 
would allocate the grants to their most efficient use. An alternative view is that 
conditionalities effectively promote investments in some activities that should be subsidised, 
either because of positive externalities, or because of the failure from the part of the parents 
to recognize the long run returns to such activities (Das, Do, and Özler, 2005; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2005). Some commentators have also argued that conditionalities provide a 
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political justification that allows the political success and survival of CCTs which might be 
an important redistribution tool (Gelbach and Pritchett, 2002).  
 
However, the conditionalities also come at some cost. They increase the cost of running the 
program. For instance, conditionality related cost amount to 24% of the total costs (excluding 
transfers) of PROGRESA (Caldés, Coady and Maluccio, 2006). Even more importantly, the 
conditionality might get on the way of relaxing credit constraints because some of the poorest 
households will face high costs of fulfilling the conditionality requirements (Benhassine et al, 
2013). This would be the case if poverty and the costs of fulfilling the conditionality 
requirement are positively correlated. For instance, some of the poorest households might live 
far away from the health centre and have higher transportation costs. Also, poorer households 
will have more children and they will need to go to the health centre more often, but the cash 
transfer amount is usually independent of the number of children. At the cost of higher 
program complexity, some of these issues could be tackled by tailoring eligibility rules and 
transfer amounts to individual circumstances, but these could distort behaviours and create 
perverse incentives (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006).  
 
We focus on Familias en Acción (FeA), the CCT program implemented by the Colombian 
government since 2002. Our identification strategy exploits a rule of the program that was put 
in place at its inception. In particular, children in treated municipalities who were born after 
the family‟s registration date (FRD) to FeA were not subject to the conditionality 
requirement, and the family would still receive the nutritional cash transfer as long as all 
under 7 years old children born before the FRD fulfilled the conditionality requirements. In 
other words, whether a mother received the nutritional cash transfer depended only on 
whether her children born before the FRD complied with the conditionality, and hence the 
number of preventive visits of children born after the FRD was completely irrelevant for the 
cash transfer. Moreover, the nutritional cash transfer is a lump sum, which does not depend 
on the number of children under 7 years old who were born before the FRD (as long as there 
is at least one). 
 
This eligibility rule interacts with another important feature of the program: the number of 
health centre visits younger children had to attend to fulfil the conditionality requirements is 
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larger than those that older children had to attend. For instance, children younger than 12 
months had to attend five visits a year, while children older than 2 are only requested to have 
two visits per year. Hence, even if young children born after the FRD are taken to preventive 
care visits with their older siblings, they will have less preventive visits than a child who was 
born before the FRD and fulfils the conditionality requirements. We also note that our 
identification strategy provides a lower bound estimate of the effect of the conditionality as 
some children born after the FRD might get preventive care visits only because their older 
siblings are getting them (and they are taken along with them). 
 
The first contribution of this paper is to study the role played by one of the conditionalities 
often imposed on recipients of a typical CCT:  a proportion (or all) of the cash transfer is 
provided only if young children are up to date with a certain schedule of preventive health 
care visits. We ask the question:  how different will be the preventive care received by a 
young child if the cash transfer that the mother receives only depends on the older siblings 
being up to date with preventive check-ups instead of the both the older siblings and the 
young child himself. Answering this question is important not only in its own right, but also 
because it provides insights of why some mothers do not take their children to preventive 
health care visits. If the conditionality is important, it implies that low perceived returns of 
preventive care (either because benefits are perceived as small or costs are high) must be a 
reason why some children do not receive preventive care among poor households in 
Colombia. Alternative reasons include credit constraints and lack of women empowerment, 
which would be relaxed even with an unconditional cash transfer. Hence, analysing the role 
of conditionality provides interesting insights on the barriers for preventive health care use in 
developing countries. 
 
The second contribution of this paper is to estimate the effect of preventive health care visits 
on child‟s health. Again, this is not only important in its own right, but it is also crucial to 
provide an interpretation to the effect of conditionalities. If preventive care is ineffective 
(possibly because health care is of poor quality), then it would be natural to find a positive 
effect of the conditionality on the demand for preventive health care (as the benefits of 
preventive care would be null for the mother and/or child in the absence of the 
conditionality). However, this increase in preventive care visits would be a complete 
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deadweight loss, which would be best avoided (and hence an unconditional cash transfer 
would be better than a conditional one).
3
 On the other hand, should we find that preventive 
care visits improve health status, then the question becomes why parents do not use these 
services (which are typically free). The answers could be either a failure to recognize the 
benefits of such an investment (Jensen, 2010) or an excessive net cost, in terms of borrowing 
or bequest constraints (Martinelli and Parker, 2003) (including the opportunity cost).  
 
Our first finding is that conditionalities are important for preventive care visits. Lack of 
conditionality reduces by 50 percent the number of preventive care visits that young children 
attend. Because households were already fulfilling the conditionality requirement for their 
older children, our estimated effect must be interpreted as the effect of conditionality in a 
setting where the activities that are being incentivized are already salient and have been 
received endorsement by the government. This contrasts with the lack of effects of school 
related conditionality in a setting where schooling has also received endorsement and been 
made salient (Benhassine et al, 2013). 
 
Our second finding highlights the importance of preventive care for children health. The 
eligibility rule for the conditionality provides us with an exogenous source of variation in 
exposure to preventive care visits across children. We exploit this source of variation to 
assess the causal impact of preventive care on a set of health outcomes. Our results indicate 
that preventive care improves a composite health indicator that includes measures of child 
morbidity (symptoms of respiratory disease and diarrhoea) and nutritional status. When we 
consider the individual components of the index, preventive care only decreases significantly 
the probability of children being underweight, although all other measures move in the same 
direction. 
 
Despite their importance, the existing knowledge of the marginal effect of conditionality in 
conditional cash transfer programs is limited, and especially focused on educational 
outcomes. Brauw and Hoddinott (2011), using data collected for the Mexico‟s PROGRESA 
program, exploit the fact that some beneﬁciaries eligible for transfers did not receive the 
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 Unless, of course, the increased demand for preventive health care is matched with an improvement of its 
quality. 
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forms needed to monitor the attendance of their children at school. They find that the absence 
of these forms reduces the probability that the children attend school, especially among those 
transitioning to lower secondary school. Schady and Araujo (2008), exploiting differential 
parental beliefs on the school attendance requirement attached to program, find similar results 
using data from the Ecuadorian program Bono de Desarrollo Umano. Baird et al. (2011) 
show experimental evidence on the relative effectiveness of a conditional and unconditional 
cash transfer program on young girls‟ human capital investment and family formation in 
Malawi. Their findings indicate that girls who received the conditional treatment feature 
higher school attendance rates and improved their test scores, whilst those in the 
unconditional arm feature substantially lower pregnancy and marriage rates. In light of their 
results, a conditional cash transfer for young children that switches to unconditional once the 
girls complete a certain grade would increase human capital formation, while also delaying 
marriage and reducing early pregnancy. Akresh et al. (2013), using data from a randomized 
trial in Burkina Faso, show that conditional programs are more effective in improving the 
school enrolment of children less likely to go to school, such as girls, younger and low ability 
kids, than unconditional programs  
 
Closer to our paper, Akresh et al. (2012) uses a cluster randomized trial in Burkina Faso and 
find that unconditional cash transfers did not increase preventive care visits but conditional 
ones did. Their paper and ours complement each other: although we must deal with the non-
random assignment of the program, we report results on how preventive care visits affect 
child health which allows us to interpret the findings about the importance of the 
conditionality. In particular, the fact that we find preventive health care to have positive 
effects on children rules out the explanation that low demand for preventive health care is 
driven by low returns. It must also be noted that the interpretation of conditionality is 
different in both papers so we answer somewhat different questions. The effect of 
conditionality in Akresh et al. (2012) might include effects related to salience/endorsement of 
preventive care; but our paper is silence on what would happen if the transfer to older siblings 
were unconditional.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the operation of the 
program. In section 3, we briefly describe the data set we use to estimate the impact of the 
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conditionality. In section 4, we illustrate the identification strategy. Section 5 and 6 report the 
main empirical results of the paper. Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Program description  
 
Familias en Acción (FeA) was introduced by the Colombian government between 2001 and 
2002, with the intention to alleviate poverty while at the same time fostering human capital 
accumulation. The program, initially financed with a loan from the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, was modelled after PROGRESA in Mexico. It consists of cash 
transfers conditional on certain health and education activities to the poorest families living in 
the municipalities targeted by the program.    
 
In the first four years, 622 out of the 1,098 municipalities in Colombia were deemed eligible 
to qualify for the program, based on the fulfilment of several criteria: (i) They had less than 
100,000 inhabitants and were not a departmental capital; (ii) they had sufficient education 
and health infrastructures; (iii) they had a bank for delivering secure payments; (iv) the 
mayoral office had to report a battery of documents to the central government.  
 
Within each qualifying municipality, eligible households were identified as those with 
children aged from 0 to 17 years old, registered to the lowest level of the SISBEN index as of 
December 1999.
4
 When the program entered a municipality, registration of eligible 
households took place during an intensive period of one or two months. After that, few 
families registered until a new wave of registrations occurred, which in most cases took place 
past our sample period. 87% of eligible households registered in the program. 
 
The education component of the program is a monthly grant for children aged 7-17, 
conditional on the child attending at least 80 per cent of school lessons. The grant was 
approximately US$7 for each child in primary school and twice as much for each child 
attending secondary school. The health component of FeA consists of a flat rate monthly cash 
subsidy (approximately 15 US dollars) given to mothers of children younger than 7 years old 
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 The SISBEN indicator is computed using a number of different indicators of economic well-being related to 
poverty. Depending on the value of the index, each household is assigned to one of six levels. SISBEN 1 
includes roughly the 20 percent poorest households.  
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in beneficiary households (the subsidy amount is per mother rather than per child). The 
receipt of the cash transfer is conditional on fulfilling the nationally recommended schedule 
of preventive care visits for all her children below 7 years old born before the FRD.
5
 
According to our data, 76% of our respondents to the survey were aware that registered 
children had to fulfil the schedule of preventive visits for the mother to receive the health 
component subsidy. 
 
The preventive care schedule, shown in Table 1, prescribes more frequent visits for younger 
children. In particular, children aged less than 12 months must attend 5 visits per year. 
Children between 12 and 24 months are supposed to attend 3 visits, while children older than 
2 are only required to have 2 visits per year. Consequently, if a young child born after the 
FRD is only taken to preventive care whenever an older child (born before the FRD, and 
hence subject to the conditionality) is taken, the visits of the young child will not be sufficient 
to make the young child comply with the due preventive care visits. This is key for the 
interpretation of our findings.  
 
During the preventive care visits, a nurse assesses the child‟s psychomotor development, 
weights and measures the child, provides nutrition advice and reviews the child‟s compliance 
with the vaccination schedule. Moreover, children attending these visits are given iron 
supplements and de-worming drugs. Hence, the preventive care visits could improve health 
through two different channels: the possible diet improvements following the nutritional 
advice received during the visits (Penny et al. 2005 and Santos et al. 2001), and the intake of 
iron supplements and de-worming drugs. There is some evidence that iron is needed for 
psychomotor development and resistance to infections (Walker et al 2005, Oppenheimer 
2001), and hence iron supplementation may improve growth and reduce morbidity (Lind et al 
2004, Baqui et al. 2003, Angeles et al. 1993). De-worming may also reduce morbidity and 
increase weight (Sur et al. 2005). Hence, we can expect both morbidity and malnutrition to 
improve, especially as they interact and reinforce each other (Schorling et al 1990, Moore et 
al 2001). 
                                                          
5 The program also encourages that mothers attend talks on nutrition, hygiene, and contraception. Unlike in 
PROGRESA in Mexico, attendance to these talks is not part of the conditions that must be fulfilled to receive 




To ensure compliance with the preventive care conditions, medical personnel receive stamps 
from the municipality to be stuck on a form only when all children less than 7 year-olds who 
were born before the FRD attended the due visits. The payment of the cash subsidy is 
arranged every two months, after confirming compliance with the various conditionalities 
through the relevant forms for all kids subject to the conditionality. The subsidy is 
temporarily suspended when one child does not receive a visit without a justified reason in 
the period before the subsidy is paid. It is definitively suspended if the child does not receive 
one or more visits for four non-consecutive two-month periods or three consecutive ones, and 
when there are no more children born before the FRD who are below 7 years old in the 
household. Only when the impact evaluation results were presented to the government (hence 
once all the data used in this paper had been collected), the eligibility rule was extended to all 




We use data collected in the three waves of FeA evaluation for our study. The first wave was 
collected during the summer 2002; the second wave between July and November 2003, and 
the third wave took place between December 2005 and March 2006. Treatment 
municipalities are a stratified random sample of the 622 municipalities where the programme 
was implemented by the second wave.  Implementation of the program was staggered. The 
program had started in 26 municipalities of the sample before the first wave took place, and it 
started in 31 municipalities between the first and second wave. By the third wave, the 
program had been implemented in all treatment municipalities. The FeA dataset also include 
a sample of municipalities where the program was not implemented (comparison 
municipalities), which were selected to be as similar as possible to the treatment 
municipalities in terms of population size, percentage of urbanisation and a composite index 
of the municipality infrastructure and services. We do not use the comparison municipalities 




The extensive household questionnaires that were used for the evaluation surveys collect a 
large amount of information on the household socio-demographic structure, children‟s health 
and other pieces of information which are essential for this study such as children‟s date of 
birth and the FRD. Regarding children‟s health, the respondent (in most cases the child‟s 
mother) is asked whether the child suffered from diarrhoea as well as symptoms of acute 
respiratory infection in the 15 days previous to the interview. For every child below 7 years 
old, the mother is also asked for the number of preventive visits in the last twelve months. 
Each child is also weighed and measured at the same time or very soon after the household 
survey took place (once per household survey round).  
 
As indicated in section 2, the program could improve both nutritional status and morbidity. 
Hence, we consider both types of measures. The morbidity indicators include whether the 
child suffered from diarrhoea or symptoms of respiratory infections. Regarding nutritional 
indicators, we consider the three most common ones: stunting, underweight and wasting. A 
child is said to be stunted (underweight) if the height-for-age (weight-for-age) Z-score is 
smaller than -2.
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 Because the proportion of children being wasted is very low (1.8% of our 
sample), we use instead whether a child is at risk of being wasted, which is defined as 
whether the weight-for-height z-score is smaller than -1. While stunting is due to 
accumulated nutritional deficits, wasting is affected by short-run nutritional insults and 
underweight is a composite indicator of stunting and wasting (Martorell and Habicht, 1986). 
 
Given that the preventive visits could improve both morbidity and nutritional status, we 
collapse all five health indicators mentioned above in a summary index. This does not only 
deal with the problem of multiple inference (Kling et al. 2007; Romano and Wolf 2005, 
Liebman et al. 2004), but it improves power by averaging over different health measures, 
which are correlated among them. In particular, we use the index proposed by Anderson 
(2008), which consists of a weighted average of the standardized values of the five health 
measures (previously, the health measures have been re-defined so that 1 indicates good 
health and 0 bad health). The weights are derived from the variance-covariance matrix of the 
                                                          
6 Z-scores are computed as the difference between the variable of interest (height for example) and the median 
value for the same variable for children of the reference population with the same age (or height in the case of 
weight for height) and gender, divided by the standard deviation of the reference population for the same age (or 
height) and gender.  
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health measures, with the aim of maximizing the informational content of the index: less 
weight is given to health measures, which are highly correlated with each other. 
 
4. Identification Strategy 
Our identification strategy relies on the gradual rollout of the program which meant that even 
if two children were born in the same month-year, they could be subject to the conditionality 
requirement or not depending on what municipality they were born. Children already born at 
the time when the household registered to the FeA programme were subject to the 
conditionality requirement. Children born after the FRD were not registered in the program 
and thus were not subject to the conditionality. Therefore, the mother would still receive the 
cash transfer if the children born before the FRD complied with the conditionality. This 
eligibility rule interacts with another important feature of the program mentioned above: to 
fulfil the conditionality requirements, younger children must attend more preventive care 
visits than older children (see Table 1 for the schedule of preventive visits). 
We define the FRD for all eligible households in a treatment municipality as the median of 
the registration dates of all the households of that municipality.
7
 We define FRD at the 
municipality rather than household level because of two reasons. First, registration in the 
program was mainly driven by the program expansion: whenever the program arrived to a 
municipality, it would start registration of all the eligible households. Second, household 
specific FRD might depend on unobservable characteristics which might render the 
household specific FRD endogenous. For instance, households that delay registration might 
be those that invest less in their children anyway.   
 
We constrain the sample to children younger than 36 months. This is because 98% of 
children born after FRD have less than 36 months during the entire period of the three waves; 
hence we prefer to constrain the sample of children born before the FRD also to be younger 
than 36 months. 66% of the children were born before the municipality FRD. Because of the 
natural aging of the children and because the sample in the first wave was representative of 
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 Conceptually, the first registration date within a municipality seems more appropriate. However, we can see 
obvious coding mistakes in the FRD dates of most municipalities. Hence, our choice of the median because 
registration tended to be concentrated in intensive waves when the program would attempt to register anyone 
eligible. In the Appendix, we show that our results are generally robust to use the 10th or 20th percentile, 
although the results with the 10th percentile are noisier. 
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households with children aged 0 to 17 years of age, the third wave includes considerably 
fewer young children than the first two (see Table 2 which also reports the distribution of 
children per wave). Table 3 shows that 40% of households have both children born before 
and after the FRD, with the remaining 60% only have children born before the FRD. Note 
that we exclude households who only have children born after FRD because they would not 
be eligible to receive the FeA health component subsidy. 
 
In order to graphically preview our results, we compute the difference (in intervals of 30 
days) between the municipality FRD and the children‟s date of birth, and build 30-days 
interval dummy variables for each such interval. Then, we regress the number of preventive 
visits over month-year of birth dummies, municipality-wave dummies, and the 30-days 
interval dummies. Figure 1 shows the coefficients on those 30-days interval dummies. 
Children to the right of the FRD line are those born after the FRD and hence those not subject 
to the conditionality. As it is clear from the left panel, the coefficients decline sharply to the 
right of the FRD line, indicating that lack of conditionality reduces by around 0.55 the 
number of preventive care visits. Although the coefficients on the individual dummies are not 
statistically different from each other, our formal analysis in section 5 shows that the average 
of the coefficients to the left of the FRD is significantly different from the average of the 
coefficients to the right  at 1% level. 
 
In Figure 2, we repeat the same exercise as in the left panel but the dependent variable is the 
health index computed as we indicated in section 3. Here we also see a sharp drop for some 
of the 30-days interval dummies, but not all of them, indicating that the estimates will be 









5. Does conditionality affect the number of preventive visits?  
We implement our identification strategy estimating the following linear equation: 
 
                                            ,            (1) 
 
where the dependent variable Yijt is the total number of preventive care visits the child i 
resident in municipality j has received by time t, After_FRDij is an indicator variable that 
takes value of 1 if child i was born after the municipality j FRD, and 0 if born before the 
municipality j FRD. Tt indicates survey wave dummies (t=1,2,3), λj are municipalities fixed 
effects, μi are month-year of birth dummies and Xit a set of individual and household 
characteristics. The error term, εijt, is possibly correlated between individuals living in the 
same municipality but uncorrelated between individuals living in different municipalities. 
The coefficient of interest is α, which estimates the effect of not being subject to the 
conditionality on the number of preventive care visits that children receive in treated 
municipalities. 
 
Regression (1) makes explicit the identification strategy that we discussed in the previous 
section. Because we condition on month-year of birth dummies,                 is 
identified from children who were born in the same month-year but some were born in 
municipalities where the FRD is before that month-year while others were born in 
municipalities where the FRD is later. The gradual expansion of the program is responsible 
for the variation in FRD across municipalities. 
 
Table 4 reports estimates of regression (1). In Column 1, we include in Xit only age in year 
dummies . In column 2, we include the full set of controls in Xit: dummies for child age in 
years, household size, logarithm of birth order, gender, maternal and paternal educational 
dummies, number of siblings in the 0-6, 7-13, 14-17 age groups, and rural area residence. 
Both column 1 and 2 give very similar results: the lack of conditionality reduces the number 
of preventive visits in around 0.6 of a visit (a 50% decrease over the mean), and this is 
statistically significant at 1%. The effect that we estimate is smaller but not too different from 
that of Akresh et al. (2012), who find that children not subject to the conditionality received 
64% less visits than children subject to the conditionality in Burkina Faso.  
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Preventive care check-ups are free and other costs of taking children to preventive care are 
probably independent of the number of children taken in a given visit (i.e. transportation costs 
and opportunity cost of time). Hence, the decrease in the number of preventive visits for 
children born after the FRD should be smaller if there are some older siblings who are subject 
to the conditionality requirement. This is because the younger sibling can be taken to 
preventive care at the same time as some of the older siblings are taken at probably zero 
additional cost. Hence, the effect of the lack of conditionality should be decreasing in the 
number of siblings subject to conditionality. The larger the number of siblings subject to 
conditionality, the more opportunities there are for taking the younger sibling to preventive 
care (because the number of recommended preventive visits vary by age, it is unlikely that all 
the older siblings will go at the same time). The last column of Table 4 shows suggestive 
evidence, although not statistically significant at conventional levels: that the number siblings 
who are subject to the conditionality mitigate the negative effect of the lack of conditionality.  
 
Next, we provide direct evidence that the FeA transfers that households received do not differ 
according to whether a child is born before or after the municipality FRD. To show this, we 
estimate the same regression as (1) but using the last FeA transfer received by the household 
where the child lives (including zero if they haven‟t received a transfer). As expected, the 
estimate is small (8,805 is 8% of the average FeA transfer) and not statistically significant 
(see Table 5). We go further and test whether there are differences in the distribution of 
transfers by using as dependent variables in regression (1) a dummy variable on whether the 
household received a positive FeA transfer, as well as dummies for whether the household 






 percentiles of the distribution of the last 
transfer.
8







                                                          
8 Note that the 25th percentile is zero so the results are the same as whether or not mothers have received a positive 
transfer. 
9 The number of observations is smaller than in the previous table because there are 31 municipalities that had not 
started to receive payments by the time the first wave was collected. As nobody could receive payments in these 
municipalities, we code them as missing in the first wave instead of zero. 
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6. Do preventive care visits improve child health outcomes?  
 
As indicated in section 2, both child morbidity and nutritional status could improve following 
the intake of iron supplements and de-worming drugs, which are given to the children during 
the preventive visits, as well as the possible improvement in diet following the information 
given to the caregiver during the visit. In this section, we exploit the exogenous variation 
across children born before/after FRD in their exposure to preventive care visits, to assess the 
causal impact of preventive care in a summary health index, as well as on the measures that 
comprise it: whether a child suffers from diarrhoea, whether a child suffer from symptoms of 
respiratory infections, as well as whether the child is stunted, underweighted, and is at risk of 
wasting.  
 
Before correcting the endogeneity of preventive visits, Table 6 reports the OLS estimates of 
the health outcome variables over the number of preventive visits over the same control 
variables as regression (1) except            .  According to the OLS estimates, the 
prevalence of respiratory problems increases with the number of visits. This might be an 
indication of extremely low quality of preventive care, or more plausibly of negative self-
selection into preventive care by those individuals who have worse health conditions. For 
instance, it could be that an important share of preventive care visits happen as the child goes 
to the health centre for curative care. 
 
To estimate the effect of not being subject to the conditionality requirement, we use OLS to 
estimate regression (1) but using the health variables as dependent variables, instead of the 
number of visits. These results are the reduced form of our model and relate health outcomes 
to conditionalities. The estimates, reported in Table 7, shows that not being subject to the 
conditionality reduces the value of the composite health index (higher values of the index 
indicate better health), at 5% level of significance. When we consider the individual 
components of the index, they all go in the same direction: not being subject to the 
conditionality reduces health; but the only significant one on its own at 10% level is the 
probability of the child being underweight, which increases by 7.2 percentage points. Here it 
is clear that the index allow us to improve power by averaging over individual outcomes 
measures, which are all affected in the same direction.  
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Finally, to estimate the effect of preventive care on health, we use             as an 
instrument for the number of preventive care visits,       in a regression in which the 
dependent variable, a health measure, is regressed over     , municipality-wave dummies, 
month-year of birth dummies and the same covariates as those of regression (1), except of 
course              Table 8 reports the Two-Stage Least Square estimates. Consistent with 
our previous findings, we find that preventive care visits improve health (increase the value 
of the composite health index) at 5% level. The estimates of the individual components of the 
index they all go in the expected direction: more preventive visits decrease morbidity and the 
likelihood of poor nutritional status independently of the measure used. However, each single 
estimate is too imprecise to be any one of them statistically significant at 5%.  
 
Our results pose a puzzle on the demand for preventive health care. The question is: if the 
returns to this type of investment are positive, why is conditionality necessary to induce the 
beneficiaries of FeA to use them? One possibility, of course, is that these households are not 
aware of the returns. The second is that attendance to these visits implies costs for these 
households that reduce its demand. These costs could be related to opportunity costs.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have studied the effect of the conditionality in conditional cash transfer 
programs with a health component, using data from the Colombian Familias en Acción 
program. Despite conditional cash transfer programs being widely implemented in 
developing countries, little is known on the effects of the single components, the cash subsidy 
and the conditionality requirement. 
Exploiting exogeneity in eligibility rules, we focus on the effects that excluding a child from 
the conditionality requirement would have on the child‟s preventive care and health status. 
Our results show that children who are not subject to the conditionality get 0.6 preventive 
care visit less than children who are. We also find that this feeds through to the child‟s health 
status, which decreases. Ultimately, this means that preventive care visits as delivered in rural 




Figure 1 – Preventive care visits and distance from the Family Registration Date (FRD) 
measured in 30 day intervals 
 
Notes: We run a regression of the number of preventive care visits on a set of control variables and a 
set of dummy variables d
j
, j=-27,…,55, where dj=1 if 30*(j-1) days <date of birth-FRD30*j days. In 
this way d
j
 measures the difference between the child‟s date of birth and the FRD in intervals of 30 
days. The dummy variable d
-24
 is omitted from the regression (reference group). Other controls are: 
municipalities fixed effects, survey time dummies, the interaction between municipalities fixed effects 
and survey dummies, and months of birth dummies. The graph plots the coefficients of the 30 day 
interval dummies, d
j
 for j=-23,…,24 and their 95% confidence intervals computed using standard 












Figure 2 – Health and distance from the Family Registration Date (FRD) measured in 30 day 
intervals 
 
Notes: We run a regression of a health index on a set of control variables and a set of dummy 
variables d
j
, j=-27,…,55, where dj=1 if 30*(j-1) days <date of birth-FRD30*j days. In this way dj 
measures the difference between the child‟s date of birth and the FRD in intervals of 30 days. The 
dummy variable d
-24
 is omitted from the regression (reference group). Other controls are: 
municipalities fixed effects, survey time dummies, the interaction between municipalities fixed effects 
and survey dummies, and months of birth dummies. The graph plots the coefficients of the 30 day 
interval dummies, d
j
 for j=-23,…,24 and their 95% confidence intervals computed using standard 





Table 1. Preventive care visits schedule 
Age in months ≤12  13-24 25-36 37-60 61-72 73-84 
Number of visits 5 3 2 2 2 2 
Notes: The table shows the schedule of preventive care visits in FeA according to children age in months. 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of children by survey and period of birth 






    
2001 175 1,577 1,752 
2003 591 742 1,333 
2005 506 0 506 
Total 1,272 2,319 3,591 
 
Notes: The table shows the distribution of children in any period according to whether they were born before or 
after Family Registration Date to the program. 
 
 











2001 176 1,332 1,508 
2003 596 545 1,141 
2005 439 0 439 
    
Total 1,211 1,877 3,088 
 
Notes: The table shows the distribution of households with children less than 36 months old according to 








Table 4. The effect of conditionality on preventive care visits 
Dependent variable: Nro of care visits  (1) (2) (3) 
After_FRD -0.634*** -0.574*** -0.778*** 
 [0.152] [0.151] [0.228] 
Number of siblings born Before_FRD    -0.024 
   [0.071] 
Number of siblings born Before_FRD*After_FRD  0.118 
   [0.080] 
Community fixed effects*Survey fixed effects  yes yes yes 
Cohort and age effects yes yes yes 
Individual controls no no yes 
Observations 3,591 3,591 3,591 
R-squared 0.285 0.308 0.308 
Mean dep. Variable 1.25 
Notes: This table shows the OLS effect of lack of conditionality (born after Family Registration Date dummy) 
on the number of preventive care visits. In column 1 we control for municipalities fixed effects, survey time 
dummies, the interaction between municipalities fixed effects and survey dummies, months of birth dummies, 
and age in years dummies. In columns 2 and 3 we add individual and households characteristics (gender, 
logarithm of birth order, family size, maternal and paternal education dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-
13, and 14-17 age groups, rural area). In column 3 we include a control for the number siblings born before 
FRD, and its interaction with the dummy for being born after FRD. Standard errors clustered at the municipality 
level in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5. Differences in subsidy payment and amount across households with and 















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Born after FRD -8,805.57 0.027 0.009 -0.073 -0.056 
 [13,408.124] [0.053] [0.064] [0.049] [0.036] 
Observations 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 
R-squared 0.248 0.209 0.256 0.293 0.235 
Mean dep var. 87,336 0.78 0.59 0.29 0.12 
 
Notes: This table shows the OLS relation between households‟ payment received and having a child born after 
the Family Registration Date to the program. In the first column the dependent variable is the amount of pesos 
received in the last FeA payment, in the second a dummy for having received a positive payment, in the third a 
dummy for having received a payment above the 50
th
 percentile of the amount distribution, in the fourth a 
dummy for the amount being greater than the 75
th
 percentile, in the fifth greater than the 90
th
 percentile. 
Controls include individual and households characteristics (months and years of birth dummies, age in year 
dummies, gender, logarithm of birth order, family size, maternal and paternal education dummies, number of 
sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age groups, rural area), municipalities fixed effects, survey time dummies and 
the interaction between municipalities fixed effects and survey dummies. 
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Table 6. OLS Regression of Health outcomes on Preventive Care Visits  
 Dependent 








  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Preventive care 
visits -0.007 0.006 0.018*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] 
Observations 3.221 3.591 3.589 3.275 3.285 3.228 
R-squared 0.176 0.102 0.147 0.194 0.131 0.13 
Mean dep variable 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.15 
 
Notes: This table shows the OLS coefficients of preventive care visits on health outcomes (as indicated in the 
columns headings). Controls include individual and households characteristics (months and years of birth 
dummies, age in year dummies, gender, logarithm of birth order, family size, maternal and paternal education 
dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age groups, rural area), municipalities fixed effects, 
survey time dummies and the interaction between municipalities fixed effects and survey dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 













  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After_FRD -0.131** 0.066 0.073 0.054 0.072* 0.026 
 [0.051] [0.040] [0.044] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038] 
Observations 3,221 3,591 3,589 3,275 3,285 3,228 
R-squared 0.177 0.103 0.145 0.195 0.133 0.130 
Mean dep variable 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.15 
 
Notes: This table shows the OLS coefficients of lack of conditionality (born after Family Registration Date 
dummy) on health outcomes (as indicated in the columns headings). Controls include individual and households 
characteristics (months and years of birth dummies, age in year dummies, gender, logarithm of birth order, 
family size, maternal and paternal education dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age groups, 
rural area), municipalities fixed effects, survey time dummies and the interaction between municipalities fixed 
effects and survey dummies. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.  





Table 8. TSLS Regression of Health Outcomes on Preventive Care Visits 









  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Preventive care visits 0.223** -0.115 -0.126 -0.092 -0.124* -0.045 
 [0.103] [0.071] [0.083] [0.070] [0.069] [0.067] 
Observations 3.221 3.591 3.589 3.275 3.285 3.228 
F(1,56) 13.77 14.43 14.46 14.1 14.05 13.73 
Prob>F 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
Mean dep variable 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.15 
 
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of a separate Two-Stage Least Square regression of a health variable (as 
indicated in the column heading) on the number of preventive care visits. Controls include individual and 
households characteristics (months and years of birth dummies, age in year dummies, gender, logarithm of birth 
order, family size, maternal and paternal education dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age 
groups, rural area), municipalities fixed effects, survey time dummies and the interaction between municipalities 
fixed effects and survey dummies. Preventive care visit is instrumented with the dummy for being born after 
Family Registration Date. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets. 



















Akresh, R., de Walque D., Kazianga, H. 2012. Alternative Cash Transfer Delivery 
Mechanisms. Impacts on Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits in Burkina Faso. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 
 
Akresh, R., de Walque D., Kazianga, H. 2013. Alternative Cash Transfer and Child 
Schooling: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation of the Role of Conditionality. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 
Angeles, I. T., Schltink, W. J., Matulessi, P., Gross, R., Sastroamidjoio. 1993. Decreased rate 
of stunting among anemic Indonesian preschool children through iron supplementation. 
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 58(3): 339 vol. 58 no. 3 339-342 
Anderson, M. L. 2008. Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early 
Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training 
Projects. Journal of the American Statistical Association 103 (484): 1481–1495.  
 
Attanasio, O., Gomez L. C., Rojas A. G., Vera-Hernández, M. 2004.  Child health in rural 
Colombia: determinants and policy interventions. Economics and Human Biology 2(3): 411-
438.  
 
Attanasio, O., Battistin, E., Fitzsimons, E., Vera-Hernández, M. 2005. The Short-term impact 
of a conditional cash subsidy on child health and nutrition in Colombia. Institute for Fiscal 
Studies: London, UK 
 
Attanasio, O., Maro, V., Vera-Hernández, M. 2013. Communiy Nurseries and the Nutritional 
Status of poor Children. Evidence from Colombia, The Economic Journal 123(571): 1025-
1058. 
 
Baird, S., McIntosh, C., and Ozler, B. 2011. Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash 
Transfer Experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(4): 1709-1753 
 
Baqui, H., Zaman, K., Persson, L., Arifeen, S., Yunus, M., Begum, N., Black, R.  2003. 
Simultaneous Weekly Supplementation of Iron and Zinc Is Associated with Lower Morbidity 
Due to Diarrhea and Acute Lower Respiratory Infection in Bangladeshi Infants 
The Journal of Nutrition, 133 (12): 4150-4157 
 
Barham, T., and Maluccio, J. 2009. “Eradicating Diseases: The Effect of Conditional Cash 
Transfers on Vaccination Coverage in Rural Nicaragua.” Journal of Health Economics 28 (3) 
(May): 611–621.  
 
Behrman, J, and Hoddinott, J. 2005. “Programme Evaluation with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
and Selective Implementation: The Mexican PROGRESA Impact on Child Nutrition.” 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 67 (4): 547–569.  
 25 
 
Benhassine, N., Devoto, F., Duflo, E., Dupas, P., and Pouliquen, V. 2013. Turning a Shove 
into a Nudge? A „Labeled Cash Transfer‟ for Education. Working Paper 19227. National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
  
Brauw, A. and Hoddinott J. 2011. Must conditional cash transfer programs be conditioned to 
be effective? The impact of conditioning transfers on school enrollment in Mexico. Journal 
of Development Economics, 96(2): 359-370 
 
Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F., Leite, F. 2003 Conditional Cash Transfers, Schooling, and 
Child Labor: Micro-Simulating Brazil's Bolsa Escola Program”, The World Bank Economic 
Review, 17(2): 229-254 
 
Caldes, N., Coady, D., Maluccio, J., 2006. The cost of poverty alleviation transfer programs: 
a comparative analysis of three programs in Latin America. World Development 34 (5): 818–
837. 
 
Das, J., Do, Q., and Özler B., 2005. Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfers Programs. 
World Bank Research Observer, 20(1): 57-80 
 
de Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., 2005. Conditional Cash Transfer Programs for Child Human 
Capital Development: Lessons Derived From Experience in Mexico and Brazil. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
De Janvry, A., and E Sadoulet. 2006. “Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More 
Efficient: Designing for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality.” The World Bank Economic 
Review 20 (1): 1–29.  
 
de Janvry, A., Finan, F., Sadoulet, E., Vakis, R. 2006. Can conditional cash transfer programs 
serve as safety nets in keeping children at school and from working when exposed to shocks? 
Journal of Development Economics, 79: 349-373 
 
Fiszbein, A., Schady, N., 2009. Conditional cash transfers: reducing present and future 
poverty. World Bank Policy Research Report. World Bank, Washington DC 
 
Guldan, Georgia S., Heng-Chun Fan, Xiao Ma, Zong-Zan Ni, Xia Xiang, and Ming-Zhen 
Tang. 2000. “Culturally Appropriate Nutrition Education Improves Infant Feeding and 
Growth in Rural Sichuan, China.” The Journal of Nutrition 130 (5): 1204–1211. 
 
Gelbach, J. and Pritchett, L., 2002. Is More for the Poor Less for the Poor? The Politics of 
Means-Tested Targeting.B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2(1), article 6. 
 
Gertler, P. 2004. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Improve Child Health? Evidence  from 




Jensen, R. 2010. The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2): 515-548. 
 
Kholer, H, Thornton, R. 2012. Conditional Cash Transfers and HIV/AIDS Prevention: 
Unconditionally Promising? The World Bank Economic Review, 26(2): 165-190. 
 
Kling, Jeffrey R, Jeffrey B Liebman, and Lawrence F Katz. 2007. Experimental Analysis of 
Neighborhood Effects. Econometrica 75 (1): 83–119. 
 
Liebman, Jeffrey B., Lawrence F. Katz, and Jeffrey R. Kling. 2004. Beyond Treatment 
Effects: Estimating the Relationship Between Neighborhood Poverty and Individual 
Outcomes in the MTO Experiment, Working Paper 493, Industrial Relations Section, 
Princeton University 
 
Lind, Torbjörn, Bo Lönnerdal, Hans Stenlund, Indria L. Gamayanti, Djauhar Ismail, Rosadi 
Seswandhana, and Lars-Åke Persson. 2004. “A Community-Based Randomized Controlled 
Trial of Iron and Zinc Supplementation in Indonesian Infants: Effects on Growth and 
Development.” The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 80 (3): 729–736. 
 
Martinelli, C. and Parker. S. 2003. Should Transfers to Poor Families be Conditional on 
School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective. International Economic Review, 
44(2): 523-544. 
 
Martorell, Reynaldo, and Jean_Pierre Habicht. 1986. “Growth in Early Childhood in 
Developing Countries.” In Human Growth: A Comprehensive Treatise. 2nd ed. Vol. 3. New 
York: Plenum Press. 
 
Mazumdar, S., Mills, A., and Powell-jackson, T. 2012. Financial Incentives in Health: New 
Evidence from India's Janani Suraksha Yojana, mimeo 
 
Moore, SR., Limab, AAM., Conawayc, MR ., Schorlingd, JB, Soaresb, AM, Guerrant, RL. 
2001. Early childhood diarrhoea and helminthiases associate with long-term linear growth 
faltering. International Journal of Epidemiology, 30(6): 1457-1464 
 
Oppenheimer, Stephen J. 2001. Iron and Its Relation to Immunity and Infectious Disease. The 
Journal of Nutrition 131 (2): 616S–635S 
 
Penny, Mary E, Hilary M Creed-Kanashiro, Rebecca C Robert, M Rocio Narro, Laura E 
Caulfield, and Robert E Black. 2005. Effectiveness of an Educational Intervention Delivered 
Through the Health Services to Improve Nutrition in Young Children: a Cluster-randomised 
Controlled Trial. The Lancet 365 (9474): 1863–1872.  
 
Powell-Jackson, T., and Hanson, K. 2012. Financial Incentives for Maternal Health: Impact 
of a National Programme in Nepal. Journal of Health Economics 31 (1): 271–284. 
 
Romano, J. P., and M. Wolf. 2005. Stepwise Multiple Testing as Formalized Data Snooping. 
Econometrica 73 (4): 1237–1282. 
 27 
 
Santos, I., Victora, C., Martines, J., Gonçalves, H., Gigante, D., Valle, N., and G. Pelto. 2001. 
Nutrition Counseling Increases Weight Gain Among Brazilian Children. The Journal of 
Nutrition 131 (11): 2866–2873. 
 
Schady, N. and Araujo M. C., 2008. Cash Transfers, Conditions, and School Enrollment in 
Ecuador. Economia, 8(2): 43-70.  
 
Schorling, J., Guerrant, R., Moy, R., Choto, R., Booth, I., and Mcneish. A. 1990. Diarrhoea 
and Catch-up Growth. The Lancet 335 (8689): 599–600. 
 
Schultz, T. Paul, “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty 
Program,” Journal of Development Economics, 74(2004): 199-250. 
 
Skoufias, E., Parker, S. 2001. Conditional Cash Transfers and Their Impact on Child Work 
and Schooling: Evidence from the PROGRESA Program in Mexico. Economica, 2(1): 45-52. 
 
Sur, D., Saha, D. R., Manna, B., Rajendran, K., Bhattacharya, S. K. 2005. Periodic 
deworming with albendazole and its impact on growth status and diarrhoeal incidence among 
children in an urban slum of India, Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine 
and Hygiene, 99(4): 261-267 
 
Walker, C., Kordas, K., Stoltzfus, R., and R. Black. 2005. Interactive Effects of Iron and Zinc 
on Biochemical and Functional Outcomes in Supplementation Trials. The American Journal 




















































A1. Descriptive statistics 
Definition Mean Sd. Min Max 
Covariates:     
1 if the child is born after median family registration date, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48 0 1 
1 if the child is born after 10th percentile family registration date, 0 otherwise 0.4 0.49 0 1 
1 if the child is born after 20th percentile family registration date, 0 otherwise 0.38 0.49 0 1 
1 if the child is interviewed in first wave, 0 otherwise 0.49 0.5 0 1 
1 if the child is interviewed in second wave, 0 otherwise 0.37 0.48 0 1 
1 if the child is interviewed in third wave, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.35 0 1 
1 if the child is female, 0 if the child is a male 0.48 0.5 0 1 
Child age in years 1.16 0.81 0 2 
Family size 6.84 2.36 2 21 
Order of the child in the family 4.23 1.84 1 13 
Logarithm of order of the child in the family 1.34 0.46 0 2.56 
1 if head has below primary education, 0 otherwise 0.66 0.47 0 1 
1 if head has below secondary education, 0 otherwise 0.3 0.46 0 1 
1 if head has secondary education, 0 otherwise 0.04 0.19 0 1 
1 if mother has below primary education, 0 otherwise 0.59 0.49 0 1 
1 if mother has below secondary education, 0 otherwise 0.36 0.48 0 1 
1 if mother has secondary education, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Number of siblings in the 0-6 age group 2.44 1 0 7 
Number of siblings in the 7-13 age group 1.42 1.2 0 6 
Number of siblings in the 14-17 age group 0.39 0.67 0 3 
1 if the household lives in the rural part of the municipality, 0 otherwise 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Other:         
Number of visits the child received since born until ≤36 months old 1.25 1.7 0 12 
Number of siblings subject to the conditionality 1.35 1.09 0 6 




1 if the child suffers acute diarrhoea in the last 15 days, 0 otherwise 0.21 0.41 0 1 
1 if the child suffers acute respiratory infection in the last 15 days 0.41 0.49 0 1 
1 if the child is stunted, 0 otherwise 0.22 0.41 0 1 
1 if the child is underweight, 0 otherwise 0.12 0.33 0 1 
1 if the child is at risk of being wasted 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Amount of last payment received from FeA 87336 69145.9 0 930000 
1 if the household received a positive payment from FeA 0.78 0.42 0 1 
1 if the household received a payment higher than 25th percentile of the 
distribution 
0.78 0.42 0 1 
1 if the household received a payment higher than 50th percentile of the 
distribution 
0.59 0.49 0 1 
1 if the household received a payment higher than 75th percentile of the 
distribution 
0.29 0.46 0 1 
1 if the household received a payment higher than 90th percentile of the 
distribution 
0.12 0.33 0 1 
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A2. The effect of conditionality on preventive care visits 
Dependent variable: Nro of care visits  (1) (2) (3) 
After_FRD (10th percentile) -0.495** -0.475** -0.514** 
 [0.191] [0.186] [0.253] 
Number of siblings born Before_FRD _10th pctl  0.035 
   [0.076] 
Number of siblings born Before_FRD*After_FRD_10th pctl 0.027 
   [0.091] 
Observations 3,591 3,591 3,591 
R-squared 0.284 0.307 0.308 
After_FRD (20th percentile) -0.608*** -0.549*** -0.698*** 
 [0.187] [0.186] [0.229] 
Number of siblings born Before_FRD _20th pctl  0.004 
   [0.074] 
Number of siblings born Before_FRD*After_FRD_20th pctl 0.082 
   [0.094] 
Observations 3,591 3,591 3,591 
R-squared 0.285 0.308 0.308 
Community fixed effects*Survey fixed 
effects  
yes yes yes 
Cohort and age effects yes yes yes 
Individual controls no no yes 
Mean dep. Variable 1.25 
 
Notes: This table shows the OLS effect of lack of conditionality (born after Family Registration Date dummy) 
on the number of health care visits. The upper panel shows estimates using the 10
th
 percentile of the FRD, the 
bottom using the 20
th
 percentile. In column 1 we control for municipalities fixed effects, survey time dummies, 
the interaction between municipalities fixed effects and survey dummies, months of birth dummies, and age in 
years dummies. In columns 2 and 3 we add individual and households characteristics (gender, logarithm of birth 
order, family size, maternal and paternal education dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age 
groups, rural area). In column 3 we include a control for the number siblings born before FRD, and its 
interaction with the dummy for being born after FRD. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in 
brackets.  










A3. Differences in subsidy payment and amount across households with and without children 






















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Born after FRD (10th percentile) 2,257.99 -0.007 -0.013 -0.005 0.022 
 [6,507.796] [0.040] [0.043] [0.043] [0.027] 
Observations 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 
R-squared 0.248 0.209 0.256 0.292 0.234 
Born after FRD (20th percentile) -8,725.60 -0.061 -0.087 -0.064 -0.031 
 [7,640.754] [0.045] [0.059] [0.045] [0.039] 
Observations 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641 
R-squared 0.248 0.21 0.256 0.293 0.234 
Mean dep var. 87,336 0.78 0.59 0.29 0.12 
Notes: This table shows the OLS relation between households‟ payment received and having a child born after 
Family Registration Date to the program. The upper panel shows estimates using the 10
th
 percentile of the FRD, 
the bottom using the 20
th
 percentile. In the first column the dependent variable is the amount of pesos received 
in the last FeA payment, in the second a dummy for having received a positive payment, in the third a dummy 
for having received a payment above the 25
th
 percentile of the amount distribution, in the fourth a dummy for 
the amount being greater than the 50
th
 percentile, in the fifth greater than the 75
th
 percentile, and in the last 
greater than the 90
th
 percentile. Controls include individual and households characteristics (months and years of 
birth dummies, age in year dummies, gender, logarithm of birth order, family size, maternal and paternal 
education dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age groups, rural area), municipalities fixed 













A4. OLS Reduced form Regression of Lack of Conditionality on Health Outcomes 










  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
After_FRD (10th pctl) -0.065 0.046 0.003 0.023 0.069** 0.024 
 [0.047] [0.033] [0.034] [0.032] [0.033] [0.031] 
Observations 3,221 3,591 3,589 3,275 3,285 3,228 
R-squared 0.176 0.103 0.144 0.194 0.134 0.13 
After_FRD (20th pctl) -0.117*** 0.068** 0.049 0.042 0.086*** 0.017 
 [0.043] [0.031] [0.038] [0.030] [0.030] [0.033] 
Observations 3,221 3,591 3,589 3,275 3,285 3,228 
R-squared 0.177 0.103 0.145 0.195 0.134 0.13 
Mean dep variable 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.15 
 
Notes: This table shows the OLS coefficients of lack of conditionality (born after Family Registration Date 
dummy) on health outcomes. The upper panel shows estimates using the 10
th
 percentile of the FRD, the bottom 
using the 20
th
 percentile. Controls include individual and households characteristics (months and years of birth 
dummies, age in year dummies, gender, logarithm of birth order, family size, maternal and paternal education 
dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age groups, rural area), municipalities fixed effects, 
survey time dummies and the interaction between municipalities fixed effects and survey dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.  




























  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument: After_FRD (10th pctl)           
Preventive care visits 0.137 -0.096 -0.005 -0.049 -0.146 -0.05 
 [0.109] [0.073] [0.071] [0.071] [0.093] [0.068] 
Observations 3,221 3,591 3,589 3,275 3,285 3,228 
F(1,56) 7 6.54 6.55 6.59 6.57 6.93 
Prob>F 0.0106 0.0133 0.0132 0.013 0.0131 0.0109 
Instrument: After_FRD (20th pctl)           
Preventive care visits 0.209* -0.123* -0.089 -0.073 -0.151* -0.031 
 [0.112] [0.070] [0.078] [0.062] [0.077] [0.061] 
Observations 3,221 3,591 3,589 3,275 3,285 3,228 
F(1,56) 8.65 8.75 8.76 8.52 8.34 8.63 
Prob>F 0.0047 0.0045 0.0045 0.0051 0.0055 0.0048 
Mean dep variable 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.12 0.15 
 
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of a separate Two-Stage Least Square regression of a health variable (as 
indicated in the column heading) on preventive care. The upper panel shows estimates using the 10
th
 percentile 
of the FRD, the bottom using the 20
th
 percentile. Controls include individual and households characteristics 
(months and years of birth dummies, age in year dummies, gender, logarithm of birth order, family size, 
maternal and paternal education dummies, number of sibling in the 0-6, 7-13, and 14-17 age groups, rural area), 
municipalities fixed effects, survey time dummies and the interaction between municipalities fixed effects and 
survey dummies. Preventive care visit is instrumented with the dummy for being born after Family Registration 
Date. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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